University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2004

George Liska's Realist Alliance Theory, And The Transformation Of
Nato
Sergey Kireyev
University of Central Florida

Part of the Political Science Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Kireyev, Sergey, "George Liska's Realist Alliance Theory, And The Transformation Of Nato" (2004).
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 201.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/201

GEORGE LISKA’S REALIST ALLIANCE THEORY,
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATO

by

SERGEY KIREYEV
B.A. Mars Hill College, 2000

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Fall Term
2004

© 2004 Sergey Kireyev

ii

ABSTRACT

In many aspects, political theory forms a subjective
structure of this abstract science.

Perhaps, it is due to the

fact that unlike natural sciences or mathematics, social
sciences often lack the privilege of testing the theories in
absolute and unadulterated conditions.

Nonetheless, such nature

of the science allows for a certain degree of flexibility, when
applying political theories to real-world phenomena.
Alliances and coalitions in international relations form
the backbone of the theory, concerning IR scholars with two main
questions: Why do alliances and coalitions form? And, what keeps
alliances and coalitions together? As the core of my research, I
examined NATO, as the most prominent and long-lasting alliance
of our time, through the prism of alliance formation and
cohesion theory introduced by George Liska.

In particular, I

explored the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
over the term of its existence, and sought to determine whether
Liska’s principles still apply to the contemporary situation,
and in particular, how may the variables have altered the
application of this scholar’s theory to our future understanding
of alliances.
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In its essence, this is a comparative study of the same
alliance during the different stages of its existence. In
particular, the comparison dissects such aspects of alliance
theory as alignment, alliance formation, efficacy, and reasons
for possible dissolution.
As a result, the study led to a conclusion, that despite
the permutations around and within NATO, the basic realist
principles that may explain the mechanism of this alliance’s
formation and cohesion still apply to the contemporary
organization.
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This work is dedicated to my wife Roxanna, my extended family,
and all those who saw me through my academic ordeal. To you,
this is my sincere and genuine ‘Thank You!’
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has come
under the examining eye of many scholars of international
politics.

Since the formation of this alliance on April 4th,

1949, its members have set their sights on protecting the
interests of all the nations in the North Atlantic region.

This

was seen as an appropriate response to the expanding influence
of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

Those goals were mainly

of a security and strategic character, but the focus of NATO has
expanded over the years to directly and indirectly include
political and economic parameters as well.

The demise of the

Soviet Union in the early 90’s rendered a majority of the
organization’s goals and objectives obsolete.

Gone was the

threat of the Soviet invasion into the Western Europe, gone was
the Eastern European buffer zone, which existed for nearly half
a century, however the NATO started seeking to fill the Eastern
and Central European power vacuum by allowing a number of former
Warsaw Pact states to join its ranks.

Today, NATO expansion

debates are no longer limited to the discussion of strategic
alignments, but have acquired a broader nature.

The role of

NATO is also being discussed in the context of international
policy, macroeconomics, and its relationship with the European
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Union.

Many scholars ask a simple and straightforward question:

Since the primary focus of the NATO’s strategic mission (which
was the Soviet Union) has disappeared, what is the purpose of
the alliance’s existence, let alone, its expansion?
This question of enduring cohesion among NATO’s membernations presents an interesting challenge to alliance theory
introduced by George Liska, which particularly focuses on
polarities and dynamics of alignment, when major core powers
attract weaker countries into an alliance1.

The author’s logic

regarding alignment in alliance formation is clear: a weaker
state seeks protection from a stronger state, in response to a
potential threat from an adversary, whereas a stronger state
acts in self-interest, protecting the resources of the weaker
state from incursion by the foe.

The appeal of joining an

alliance is furthermore shaped by the perceived balance between
the benefits and liabilities for individual members.

If the

burdens prove to be in excess of the aggression or threat
thereof, an alliance becomes unlikely.

In addition, the

efficacy of any particular alliance (aside from threat
deterrence) also lies in its ability to prevent conflict and
improve relations among participating states, as well as its
capacity to provide tools of consultation for those involved.
1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962),
13
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p.

Thus, the nature of an alliance is clearly defined as a product
of a polarity system, with clearly identifiable ‘poles’.

That,

not being the case in the contemporary world, leads one to
assume that either NATO has transcended its role as a
traditional defensive alliance, or Liska’s theory is due for
revision.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
OVERVIEW

Considering the theoretical nature of this research, basic
research assumptions need to be established, which will be
further elaborated later in this chapter.

First and foremost,

the nature and internal relations of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization will be examined prior to the events of the preIraqi war divisions.

This approach is not due to the scientific

negligence, but rather is for the sake of simplifying the
research project. Regardless, NATO’s internal affairs following
September 11th of 2001 reflect the endurance of the alliance
furthermore. Second, the theoretical basis for this research
would follow the principles, established by George Liska, where:
a. Weaker states align themselves with core powers for the
sake of protecting

themselves from a potential

adversary, achieving status, and stability.
b. Defensive alliance formation (e.g. NATO) is often
rationalized through the function of common ideology.
c. The efficacy of alliances lies in their capability to
always deter the common threat.
d. Key reasons for alliance dissolution lie in unequal
distribution of costs and benefits (gains and
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responsibilities), as well as the disappearance of the
common threat.
This explanation, albeit simple, serves as the underpinning for
overviews of previous research in this field.
Since the nature of this research incorporates a
theoretical and comparative perspective, theoretical sources
form the backbone of this research project, and therefore heavy
emphasis was placed on selecting publications that were both
established, in terms of academic value, as well as modern
enough to have taken the contemporary global situation into
account. George Liska’s Nations in Alliance has won recognition
among IR scholars worldwide.

This 1962 publication discusses

the main governing principles of alliance alignments, cohesion,
dissolution, and effectiveness, as well as the future
perspectives of alliances.

The particular appeal of Liska’s

work lies in relative simplicity and universality of its
theories. Despite its relative age, the level of acknowledgement
that this work has received establishes it as a useful
foundation for any IR theoretical research work.

Considering

the nature of Liska’s text, and the focus of this research, the
author’s work is directly related to the hypothesis of this
project. Methodologically, any conclusions regarding the
application and temporal stability of Liska’s theories would be
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impossible to maintain, given that no alternative means of
explaining alliance formation were examined. Therefore, a number
of supporting theoretical texts were chosen, in order to test
possible future hypotheses.
The Origins of Alliances1 written by Stephen M. Walt
presents an interesting alternative to the previously discussed
text.

As the central hypothesis for his work, the author

challenges the widely accepted theories of alliance alignment,
based on exhibition of power, as well as ideological
similarities as discussed by George Liska and Hans Morgenthau.
He proposes that the proponents of the traditional approaches
rarely systematically test their theories, and thus fall short
in terms of explaining real-world circumstances. Particularly,
Liska and Morgenthau discuss alliance matters in terms of
balance of power, albeit their applicability of this concept is
somewhat different.

Stephen Walt argues that Hans Morgenthau’s

work primarily utilizes subjective evidence to support its
points in the IR cornerstone text Politics among Nations, and
reiterates the necessity of balance of power functions in a
system of several states2.

In addition, Walt interprets

Morgenthau’s arguments as suggestive of ideological solidarity
as a valid aligning factor, and arguing that the more similar
1
2

See Stephen M. Walt,
Ibid, p.7

The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987).
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two states are, the more likely they are to ally1.

Despite

Walt’s disagreement with Morgenthau’s and Liska’s work over the
lack of focus, the author’s premise for alliance formation
argues that balancing power against potential foes is far more
acceptable than ‘bandwagoning’, and ideological solidarity is
usually a stronger factor when a high level of international
security threat exists, thus borrowing and narrowing down the
broader concepts of the aforementioned scholars2.

Stephen Walt’s

publication is indispensable to this project from a dual
perspective. The theoretical arguments of his research helped me
develop a more diverse view of the seemingly similar approach to
alliance theory.

In addition, it later served to support my

findings, in terms of universality of the neorealist alliance
approach.
Michael Sullivan’s Theories of International Relations:
Transition vs. Persistence was a valuable theoretical source,
and includes an alternative outlook on the field of IR theory by
challenging the neorealist theoretical approaches in
international relations theory, which dominate the field.
Sullivan suggests that the neorealist and neoliberalist theories
of today are not as universal in their application, as their
proponents may assume.
1
See Stephen M. Walt,
p. 33.
2
Ibid, p. 263

To be precise, Sullivan broaches the

The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987),
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topic of ‘chameleon’ dependent variables1, arguing that many
contradicting scholars simply ignore the fact that different
theories are based on different sets of variables.

Therefore,

theories in IR would be better suited for their particular
conditions and circumstances, versus arguing a consistent and
unchanging dogma.

In terms of contribution to this project,

Sullivan’s work was similar in suitability to Stephen Walt’s
work.

The author’s interpretation of processes that lead to

alliance formation expanded the range of my theoretical
understanding.

Yet, in contrast, Sullivan’s principles of

‘chameleon’ variables neither supported nor undermined my
findings.
Contending Theories of International Relations by James E.
Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is a well-known
theoretical text, which was intended for use as a comprehensive
textbook for advanced IR classes.

The textbook includes an

introduction and an overview of numerous approaches to IR
theory, as well as an overview of contemporary approaches to
international relations theory.

Although the majority of the

material in the textbook is not highly detailed and exhaustive,
the text helped me set the stage for my work, by juxtaposing a

1

See Michael P. Sullivan, Theories of International Relations, (New York: Palgrave,
2001), p. 5
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number of theoretical ideas, and explaining some of the basics
in IR theory (i.e. polarity theory).
Since the focus of my research is to conduct a systematic
test of alliance theories, this publication is vital to my work.
Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen are the
scholars responsible for collecting one of the most
comprehensive compilations of essays on alliances within one
single publication.

Their text Alliance in International

Politics is separated into three specific sections, which
include the introduction to alliance theory, general theory, and
aspects of alliances.

The series of essays include work from

such distinguished scholars as Hans Morgenthau, Christopher
Bladen, Mancur Olson, and Karl W. Deutsch, as well as a number
of other authors.

For the purpose of examining traditional

perspectives on alliances from a number of angles, this text
comes second to none.

The essay, particularly useful to this

research, was an excerpt from Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among
Nations, which laid out the precepts of the scholar’s theory on
alliance formation.
Morgenthau viewed alliances as a necessity for maintaining
balance of power in the international multi-state system.
According to that hypothesis, states seeking to improve their
own power standing on the world arena could resort to three
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options: a build-up of armaments, adding their influence to that
of other states, or preventing the adversary from obtaining the
power of other states. Regardless of the choice between the
latter two of the options, states that choose either one of
those paths will pursue an alliance-oriented policy1.
Furthermore, Morgenthau made a distinction between collective
security, and balance-of-power alliances.

Where the balance-of-

power systems place individual national interests before any
joint action, collective security establishments are intended to
protect collective interests, regardless of individual national
interests.

Morgenthau’s contribution to IR field of political

science is immeasurable, due to the impact that it had on
shaping realist thinking in the field of alliance theory2.
Morgenthau’s work allowed me to direct the focus of my work
towards a neorealist approach, and use Morgenthau’s arguments as
a backdrop for Liska’s theory.

In that manner, the article

deepened my understanding of the matter beyond the material
available in George Liska’s work.
A number of more recent articles regarding realism/neorealism theory have been published in scientific journals, such
as The Journal of Conflict Resolution, International
Organization, and World Politics.

Stephen Brooks’ article

1
See Hans Morgenthau, “Alliances”, in Alliance in International Politics, ed. Julian
R. Friedman et al. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), p. 80.
2
Ibid, p. 92.
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“Dueling Realisms” offers an in-depth perspective on theoretical
differences between realist and neo-realist schools of IR
thought.

In particular, the focus is not on structural

similarities, but rather on differences in regards to
assumptions about state behaviors. To be precise, Brooks argues
that “realism diverges regarding whether the mere possibility of
conflict conditions decision making as neorealism assumes, or
whether actors decide between policy options based on the
probability of conflict, as postclassical realism asserts”1. This
article does not primarily deal with Liska’s theory, but allows
for multi-lateral examination of state behavior in regards to
NATO within the field of realism in IR. Despite the slight
difference in topics, I found to be the article helpful in
understanding the two different camps of realist thought, and
the subject of their divergence.

Brooks’ article helped to make

the link between the NATO’s transformation, and the
applicability of neo-realist alliance ideas to its longevity.
After all, if the neo-realist perspective holds true, and
perception of the threat is a valid reason for state alignment,
then the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new
Russia would do nothing to alter the potential conflict
conditions (since Russia still looms as a formidable threat).
1

See Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms”, International Organization, Vol. 51-3
(Summer 1997), p. 472
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Perhaps, one of the most interesting articles in the field
of realist theory, and its relation to alliances was written by
Dan Reiter, and published in the July 1994 issue of World
Politics.

Reiter’s article “Learning, Realism, and Alliances”

serves as a comparative study of realist theory and learning
theory, and the application of those theories to the principles
of alliance formation in International Relations.

Throughout

the article, author seeks to prove several important points: not
only that the weaker, smaller states use historical experiences
as their ‘rule of thumb’ for alliance choices, but levels of
threat (a predominant alliance formation explanation among
realists) serves only as a minor factor in the decision-making
process.

Nonetheless, Reiter points out that one should not

discard basic realist assumptions regarding decision-making by
states, but rather use his findings as “an enlightened version
of realism”1.

What makes Reiter’s work useful in my case is his

approach to state decision-making in alliance formation, and
offers an alternative to Liska’s view. It is indirectly linked
to the my analysis of constraints existing within NATO.
The issue of NATO transformation, following the break up of
the Soviet Union becomes the next point of interest. NATO
Transformed by David Yost is a text that discusses the post-Cold
1

See Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the
Past”, World Politics, Vol. 46-4 (July, 1994), p. 526
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War transformation of this organization, and the modern
challenges that it faces in maintaining itself, as well as
following its primary goals.

Understanding the organizational

challenges and perspectives during the process of transformation
is an important goal of the secondary step of this research, and
the author makes an interesting case for the evolution of this
alliance.

Yost’s text was paramount to this research work, not

only in the terms of its usefulness as a historical reference,
but also as a book that expanded on the topics of NATO’s
structural designs and transformation.
Sean Kay’s NATO and the Future of European Security is an
analytical examination of contemporary circumstances surrounding
the organization.

The author uses empirical evidence to argue

that despite the transformation of Europe after the Cold War,
this region is still in need of NATO, as a balancing force for
stability in the region.

His concluding comments that NATO will

continue to exist until the region reaches its goal of
guaranteed peace offers an optimistic perspective, regarding
this organization’s future. Although Kay’s work was similar to
Yost’s in applicability to this project, the author offered a
more analytical and subjective approach to the subject of NATO
transformation, examining the variables of internal stability.
Moreover, Kay’s reasoning and conclusions were very similar to
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the conclusions of this project, and underlined the relative
suitability of the latter.
Gale Mattox and Arthur Rachwald edited an outstanding
collection of essays, regarding the issue of NATO enlargement,
and the changing face of this organization under the title of
Enlarging NATO: the National Debates.

What makes this

publication stand out is its multi-national approach.

Articles,

written by a world-wide array of scholars, touch upon the topic
of enlargement from the perspectives of NATO members, potential
members, as well as outsider-states, who are affected by the
process.

Such design allows for a number of viewpoints, in

regards to professional perception of changes, which take place
within and around the alliance.

The collection of articles

helped to expand the issues of this research beyond theoretical
matters, by offering a number of diverse views and opinions on
the matter.

The diversity of this publication gave essence to

the enlargement debate, and described how various scholars
viewed the role of NATO, and the reasons for its persistence.
The viewpoints above all gave this work the subjective material,
needed to build upon my arguments on NATO’s persistence.
Journal articles have approached the topic of my research
from diverse perspectives.

Since I intend to examine the

transformation of NATO, as well as transformation of the United
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States as a core power, the articles selected address those
particular topics.
One of the most fascinating pieces, in regards to theory
and NATO expansion, is “Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion,
and the Core”, written by Todd Sandler in The Journal of
Conflict Resolution.

The article uses a simple cooperative game

theory, vastly used in IR simulation, and applies several
variables to modern day NATO.

Despite its highly specialized

nature, through the use of cost-benefit (gain-burden) analysis,
the article arrives at some interesting conclusions, which can
be related to Liska’s alignment theory, as well as general
alliance theory.

Sandler uses the analysis of mutual defense

game as benefit-based approach, concluding that the share of
separate gains among allies varies greatly depending on the
size, location, and border attributes of each alliance member.
That, in turn, influences the position and role of the members
within the alliance. In particular, the author uses Germany as
an example, arguing that this state is left at a bargaining
disadvantage, as opposed to Belgium, or Luxembourg, much due to
the nature of its location as an ‘outside’ ally.

As such,

Germany is left carrying a much higher defensive burden, as
opposed to the latter members of NATO. What makes this piece
relevant to my research is its approach to the subject of NATO
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internal interactions and burden-gain sharing.

Sandler, in a

way, rationalizes Liska’s alignment and alliance formation
concepts through game theory.
Robert J. Art’s “Why Western Europe Needs the United States
and NATO” is an analytical essay, published in the Spring 1996
issue of Political Science Quarterly.

Like many of his fellow

scholars, Art joins the debate on the realities of NATO’s
transformation from a tool of collective anti-Soviet security
into an active ‘security blanket’ over Western Europe.
Furthermore, Art elaborates on the specific role of the United
States within NATO: “America’s balancing role is a principal
instrument that helps keep both external threats and internal
fears from corroding Western Europe’s cohesion”1.

In many

respects, Art’s article touches upon the same topics as Sean
Kay’s piece. What makes it different and so useful for my
research is the take on the role of the United States in the
alliance. Art’s take on the U.S. role in NATO, coupled with
Liska’s concepts of internal checks and balances shaped my
understanding of intra-NATO politics, and aligning factors,
before and after Soviet disintegration.

1

See Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 111-1 (Spring, 1996), p. 38
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Robert McCalla’s “NATO’s Persistence after Cold War”
unifies a number of topics within this research project.

First

of all, it debates NATO’s possibilities for action, following
the break-up of Soviet Union, citing a number of historical
events, which led to transformation of alliances.

Next, McCalla

turns to theoretical arguments of NATO’s persistence, arguing
that alliance theory scholars have generally limited their scope
of interest to reasons for alliance formation and cohesion,
rather than reasons for alliance dissolution.

Stepping away

from the non-realist approach, McCalla turns to a ‘two-table’
analysis, exploring the internal constraints of the NATO
members, besides just the external constraints, so familiar to
the realist school of thought.

The internal constraints, which

McCalla addresses, are domestic policy pressures, exerted on the
makers of foreign policy by their domestic political
organizations and factions1. Next, the author examines the
application of organizational theory, and realist theory to
NATO’s evolution, explaining the factors and outcomes which
occurred according to those theories. As a result, McCalla’s
examination of post-Cold War NATO contributed to understanding
of the neorealist paradigm, supplementing it, rather than

1

See Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International
Organization, Vol. 50-3 (Summer, 1996), p. 446
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rejecting its canons. In terms of applicability to my research,
McCalla’s work is the most relevant piece of all, which helped
me gain understanding of domestic pressures on NATO from a
practical world perspective. Besides, since the topics of
McCalla’s work and this research are closely related, it served
as a reference on final findings and conclusions.
A number of other articles have been reviewed, and used to
supplement my existing knowledge of the subject, rather than
branching the existing knowledge.

However, if one had to

summarize the current level of understanding in my area of
research, the outcome would be as follows:
a. George Liska’s work is recognized for its contribution
to alliance theory; however, numerous alternative
theories and views exist.

Many scholars affirm that

realist/neorealist theory lacks flexibility, and could
be improved by supplementing various circumstantial
variables.
b. NATO has defied theoretical canons by continuing to
exist in the absence of threat, but a new interpretation
of alliance theory suggests that the narrow scope of
realist theory is to blame for such miscalculations.
McCalla’s and Sandler’s articles expand on the existing
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theoretical knowledge by supplementing the theory with
outside (non-realist) perspectives.
c. The role of the United States and the state’s strategy
for NATO participation are inseparable from the fate of
NATO.

While some see the US as a military balancing

power, others see its presence as beneficial to economic
and diplomatic stability within Western Europe.
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CHAPTER 3: CORE ALLIANCE THEORY AND SUPPORTING THEORIES
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Although it may seem logical to overview strictly George
Liska’s theory of alliances, it is quite unwise to take his
realist premises out of context.

Therefore, it is paramount

that another side of IR theory be addressed – that being the
structural-realist systems theory and the concepts of systemic
polarity within systemic structures.

Dougherty et al addresses

systemic IR and political theories in great detail, and defines
systemic polarity as the amount of political actors, and the
“distribution of capabilities among them”1.

According to this

notion, the specific polarity implies the structure of the
system itself, and therefore would dictate actions within the
system, which would further indicate how the actors within the
system align along the poles.

To be precise, polarity theory

elaborates that major actors-antagonists tend to separate the
international system into a number of sectors, whether
ideologically, politically, or geographically.

Those sectors

and their capacities, in turn, dictate the amount of power that
a certain state can impose on the other actors within the

1

See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International
Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 100
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system.

Therefore, the systemic distribution of state

capacities would also dictate its need to align itself with
other actors in the system, which would then increase its
influence among the major actors within the system.
Karl Deutsch and David Singer contribute a critical piece
of knowledge to polarity theory by theorizing that an bipolar
systems are more prone to war than multipolar systems, simply
because the actors within the multipolar international system
have more freedom to interact with other actors outside the
confines of alliances, than those that are bound by blocs of
coalitions imposed by the bipolar system.

Simply put, more

poles in the multipolar system maximize the number of potential
interactions, but also reduce the intensity and range of
conflicts, when those occur between the actors1. Deutsch and
Singer’s model also cites the potential for instability, due to
lack of interaction, and thus reduced number of “cross-cutting
loyalties that reduce hostility between any single dyad of
nations”2. The contribution made to the polarity theory by Edward
Mansfield was also quite important to understanding the role of
alliances and the nature of alignment in International
Relations.

This scholar suggested that there are implications

in this field of theory that reach far beyond the number of
1

See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International
Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 119
2
Ibid, p. 119
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poles in the system, and related particularly to the
distribution of power among the actors in the system.

In

particular, that relates to the stability of the system due to
equal distribution of power among major actors, and the
equilibrium is strictly dependent on the ability of one major
actor or the other to increase its capabilities, or form
alliances with lesser actors1.

Understanding of polarity theory,

as it relates to modern day NATO is quite important, considering
that NATO was a stability-generating counterweight to Warsaw
Pact imbalance between the two major actors in the bipolar
system – the same principle, suggested by Mansfield.
Despite a wide acceptance of the basic premises of polarity
theory, many scholars disagreed on the efficacy of the DeutschSinger paradigm on higher stability of the multipolar IR system.
In particular, the key criticism contends that with fewer major
actors and a higher level of confidence in the diplomatic
relations between the major actors, the possibility of conflict
among those actors would decrease due to a lower chance for
misunderstanding between the actors2. Scholars, such as Ronald
Yalem, had the opportunity to examine the emergence of China as
a third superpower, and further elaborated the implications of
multipolarity as a source of instability.
1

By increasing the

See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International
Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 120
2
Ibid, p. 120
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number of bilateral interactions the possibility for conflict
would exponentially increase, therefore trusting the fate of
international stability to each pole’s ability to prevent
bipolar alignment against it, as well as resist the temptation
to enter into such an alignment against another actor1.

Studies,

conducted by Singer and Melvin Small, could to prove or disprove
a correlation between the principles of polarity and likelihood
of war, thus rendering the debate unfruitful.
However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave scholars
an opportunity to track changes in the structural composition of
the international system.

Particularly outspoken in regards to

unforeseen changes has been John Mearsheimer, who contended that
the disappearance of the bipolar division in Europe was the key
reason for Balkan wars of the 1990s: “Although the particular
wars that broke out had specific and unique cases and origins,
it was the power imbalance that permitted such factors to lead
to the outbreak of hostilities.”

According to his theory, this

transformation, coupled with re-emergence of the united Germany
and the decline of US influence in the region, led to power
instability due to establishment of a multipolar regional
political system, previously deterred by military equality

1

See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International
Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 120
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between the two key players in the region (Soviet Union and the
US)1.
The analysis of the neorealist-structural realist debate on
the efficacy of polarity theory, as well as its iterations is
not the focus of this work. Nonetheless, recognition of the
principles of this theory would lead one to understand alignment
principles further set forth in Liska’s alliance theory, and
would give a keener eye for analyzing discrepancies in the
theory, as applied to modern-day NATO, once set against the
background of realist polarity theory. With that in mind, moving
on to an assessment and analysis of George Liska’s theory would
be most plausible.

ALLIANCE ALIGNMENT THEORY
In many ways, scholars are oftentimes concerned with the
manner in which states formed an alliance, how it operated, or
why it was dissolved, oftentimes omitting a key inquiry into
how, specifically, the states wound up in a position favorable
to alliance formation.

After all, formation of alliances would

not occur without specific pre-conditions, which necessitate
1

See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International
Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 123
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states’ movement towards a limiting union.

In his theoretical

work, George Liska identifies state alignments and realignments
as primary intra-systemic movements of actors within the
international system.

By far, key factors for such movements

are identified by the scholar as conflicts.

When the security

of the state becomes the chief concern of its leadership, and
the conflict is sufficiently intense, the latter becomes the
chief determining factor in alignment movements1.

A critical

reader may argue that economic and trade priorities often top
conflict factors as key aligning causes, however, one must
remember that this analysis targets a specific military alliance
(NATO), and moreover, the staying power of trade factors is
weaker, being restricted by fears of economic dependence and
opportunities for outside trade2.

Therefore, for the purposes of

establishing theoretical basics, alliances are created against
someone, and therefore, exist for someone’s specific purposes,
with cooperation between states being a result of conflicts with
rival states.

Liska illustrates the dynamics of alignments

between states through giving an example of a bipolar system,
where core-power states are surrounded by weaker states, where
the latter are consequently pulled into alliances.

Albeit, such

a move is nothing new to the international community, the
1
2

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 12
Ibid, p. 14
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factors underscoring such movement may be quite different from
popular perception.

In fact, the core states’ appeal does not

stem from their ability to flex the iron muscle, since in its
essence superior power does not attract.

In fact, alignment

between a core power and weaker states would come only as a
result of a conflict (or a threat thereof) of the latter with
another strong power.

As a matter of fact, alignment without a

conflict is unfavorable for either the strong or the weak state,
stretching the resources and commitments of the former and
threatening individuality of the latter.

Thus, the influencing

attraction of the superior power of a core state comes as a
result of repulsion of the weaker state by another core state,
and in its turn, the core state benefits from getting access to
weaker state’s resources and from restraining its adversary from
those resources.

Obscuring this reason for alignment and

alliance formation are the accessibility factors: “For such
tendencies and objectives to result in alignment, the lesser
state must be accessible to the potential ally directly or at
least indirectly”1.

Simplifying this notion, Liska reaffirms

that indirect access could be as limited as the stronger state’s
ability to exert political or military pressure on the weaker

1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 13
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state’s adversaries, and does not necessitate geographic
proximity between the two potential allies.
Conflicts, which lead to alignments, may manifest
themselves on a number of different scales: global, regional,
and domestic.

The emerging patterns in alignment will reflect

not only the constraints imposed on actor-states by the dominant
conflict (one, which is likely to change the entire system), but
also will be shaped by conflicts that are key to specific
subsets of nations. Liska underscores that in many ways those
non-dominant conflicts reveal themselves in regional politics,
and serve to ‘fill out’ the alignment patterns, and determine
global alignments1.

Therefore, conflicts such as the ever-

ongoing Middle Eastern turmoil may not always be the dominant
global focal point, but its regional significance to the global
system has led to continuing involvement of powers from the
outside of the region (like the United States, and Soviet Union
in the 1960s).

As influential as regional sub-systems can be on

the terms of alignments, one should not lose sight of domestic
factors as well.

When a nation is subject to an internal

conflict, the conflicting sides attempt to involve outside
forces (read, core powers) in order to add feasible credibility

1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962) pp. 18
& 20
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to their actions.

Thus, when two or more internal parties to a

conflict align themselves with different outside forces, the
internal conflict becomes a part of an international system.

If

only one party to a conflict aligns itself then the opposing
sides will seek to either neutralize the group’s influence and
activity on the domestic scale, or will seek alignments with
outside forces themselves1.

One may ask the reason for such

detailed explanation of alignment scales, but it is significant
not to lose sight of three main questions of alignment and
alliance formation: “why?”, “with whom?”, and “how much?” (in
regards to strength of commitment).

Since this chapter has

already touched upon the questions of “why?” (threat deterrence
is key), and “with whom?”, the explanation of conflict scales
serves to explain the last question of “how much?”, as well as
provide additional explanation to the previous questions.
As a recap of alignment reasons, allow me to touch upon the
key points of this portion of Liska’s theory:
a. Alignments are the means for balance-of-power
adjustments.

According to Liska “alliances aim at

maximizing gains and sharing liabilities”2.

1
2

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 21
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b. States enter into alliances in order to prevent or
reduce the influence of an opposing power, by maximizing
their own capabilities, and are driven by national
interests.
c. Alignments are performed between a core power, and
weaker states, each side experiencing limited benefits
from mutual security and shared resources.
d. Geographical proximity between allies is not a key
factor, and deficiencies can be supplemented by
ideological, cultural, or economic interests.

What

matters most is mutual ‘accessibility’ between allies,
however subjective it may be.
e. Various scales of alignment (global, regional,
domestic), as well as scales of conflict (dominant or
non-dominant) affect the nature of the alignment and the
amount of commitment to a specific alliance, resulting
from an alignment.
Speaking generally, those five points summarize the basic
premises of Liska’s alignment theory.

It would be most sensible

to move forth to a discussion of how and why alliances stay
together after they form, and the theories of their efficacy.
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GEORGE LISKA’S PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE COHESION
Since it has been established by realist dogmas, as
manifested in Liska’s work, that alliances operating within a
systemic framework of international relations seek
alignment with like actors for purposes of maximizing mutual
capabilities and serving as a collective deterrent to potential
aggression, it becomes necessary to examine underlying factors,
which allow an alliance to perform its functions, cooperate, and
remain united in doing so.

Simply put, it is an examination of

how gains are achieved, liabilities are distributed, and
participation is enforced.
As a part of elaboration of cohesive factors in alliance
theory, ideology serves as the primary focus of George Liska’s
work on the topic.

The author summarizes the goal of his

inquiry: “If allies are to stay together despite setbacks, the
grounds for alliance must be rationalized”1.

Naturally, this

rationale seeks its foundation in ideology – a form of political
‘glue’, validating states’ reasons for constraining themselves
in a union.

Furthermore, Liska argues, the presence of common

ideology serves to transform a previously cumbersome union into
an operational social institution by outlining the foundation
and limits of the alliance’s shared aims, so as to give separate
1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 61
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states a common incentive for joint action, as well as to
outline the character, intentions, and capacity of common
threats and rationales for uniting against them1.
By and large, the characteristics of ideology, which
underscore an alliance, vary according to their primary purpose.
For example, offensive alliances are oftentimes driven by
perspectives of mutual gain, overrun by ideological hegemony of
the core state, whereas defensive alliances tend to use ideology
as means of uniting the citizens of participating states into a
fabric of friendship and common interest.

Key to a successful

transformation of perspective common goals into a working
ideology is the core state capacity to stress common gains and
interest, and downplay or ignore existing differences among the
potential allies2.

After all, efficacy of any alliance is

strictly dependent upon its ability to carry out joint goals
with minimal disagreement among members.

Another goal of

successful ideological implementation must address the two
different positions – nationalist or associationist -- that
potential allies may assume, when alliance is constructed.

The

nationalist position dictates that alliance ideology is a smart
disguise for attempts at hegemonic rule over the allied states

1
2

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 62
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by the strongest ally, as well as the resulting conclusion that
such rule would be equally as unbearable as one imposed by the
enemy1.

Associationist position is by far more pragmatic, which

follows a somewhat impromptu approach to cooperation, which may
or may not result in cooperation, which, in turn, may or may not
become formalized.

The two contrasting positions characterize

not only the nature, which the alliance would assume, but also
pre-conditions alliance cohesion and dissolution principles.

In

many ways, the nationalist approach has been characteristic of
states without immediate and imminent threats to security (i.e.
United States), and has galvanized important policy agenda
within those alliances that such states did enter:
a. “[T]he struggle with the adversary must not be allowed
to obscure the duty of self-assertion within the
alliance.”2
b. “Once in the alliance… [the] power strives for
supremacy, under the cover of solidarity, and practices
expediency under the cover of principle.”3
The author also comments that the nationalist ally should
be expected to leave the alliance first, or as soon as he can;
oftentimes, separate peace arrangements, or redistribution of

1
2
3
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liabilities will take place, in order to make such exit
possible.
Associationist ideology, on the other hand, takes a more
deliberate approach to establishment of formalized ties.

The

tendency of such allies to wait for special considerations from
the stronger ally, ones that allow them to avoid triggering
conflicts of interest with the other states.

Most importantly,

the manifested necessity for participation in alliance is
reaffirmed by an associationist state through firm belief in
making the alliance function1.
Clearly, the different approaches to ideology and alliance
participation characterize the nature of the alliance itself,
giving one an opportunity to make assumptions in regards to the
future of the particular union. Moreover, the particular
ideological approach to the matter of alignment and
participation in an alliance, also condition the manner in which
‘business’ is conducted within the alliance; to be specific, the
diplomatic style would vary according to the manner, in which a
specific ally perceives its role within the alliance.

Formal

style generally pertains to a state, careful as not to demean
its role and status within the alliance, where “informality is a

1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 66
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luxury for the secure”1, characteristic of states, which possess
a greater level of security.
In their innate nature, alliances are a complex political
structure: not in the terms of international politics, but in
the terms of internal operations.

To this extent, consultation

becomes an important cohesive tool, and serves as an indicator
of the type of relations between the allies.

In some respects,

consultation is similar in nature to negotiations, however, the
amount of confidence in outcomes of a particular negotiation is
oftentimes much higher than that for a consultation.

Sharing

similar goals with negotiations (that of settling a particular
controversy to avoid direct conflict), consultation, however, is
a more intricate process, which is characterized by a sense of
community between allies2.

The notion of community is brought

about through an arrangement of joint action within an alliance,
and therefore, allowing the process to serve as a reflection of
solidarity among allies, and cohesion within the alliance.

On

the other hand, the role of consultation as a form of restraint
among allies also characterizes it as means of upholding mutual
security.

In a sense, in a formal security arrangement, which

calls for unilateral collective action, allies place faith in
consultation as a means of maintaining peace by preventing
1
2
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individual member-states from jeopardizing the arrangement
through unsolicited endeavors.

As a result, consultation could

serve as means of reassurance among members that the structure
they belong to is based upon firm precepts of solidarity.
Nonetheless, just like negotiations, consultation is a direct
method for resolving differences among alliance members.
The result of any successful consultation, unless it is
strictly formalistic, or serves strictly as means of information
exchange, is a compromise. Essentially, compromise becomes an
operational assurance of solidarity and cohesion within the
alliance, and illustrates that partners in alliances will
sacrifice some of the national interests for the good of the
union.

Cohesion of the alliance is then further promoted, when

implicit compromises are established, and allies are willing to
concede to each others unilateral decisions.

Liska writes on

this matter:
[T]he cohesion of an alliance grows as it
develops the capacity to absorb fait accomplis,
especially if previous consultation accomplished
little or nothing.1
However, when allies cannot come to an acceptable
compromise, the alliance community can follow several patterns
1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 86
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of coercive behavior.

One of the least obvious challenges that

precede compromises (or their lack) is the ability of consensus
building, not only among the members, but also on the domestic
scale.

Certainly, such circumstances would be dependent on the

nature of the compromise, as well as on the particular system of
domestic governance of the state in question: it is much more
difficult to build consensus on an issue in a democratic state
than in an autocratic one.

Limits of cohesion are furthermore

stretched in times of instability or in dire circumstances.
When internal pressures overwhelm the domestic system, memberstate may ‘lag’ in accepting certain actions or performing
necessary feats.

External pressures also play an important role

in determining the course of action for a particular state,
however, in a democratic system, internal pressures oftentimes
overwhelms external influences. When compromises or tacit and
formal agreements fail, fellow allies may exert pressure upon
the ally in question by realigning themselves within the union,
therefore threatening to isolate the one, responsible for the
conflict1.
Matters of alliance cohesion are complex and difficult to
assess, however, theoretical assessment would be easier to

1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p.
112
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follow if some basic principles of alliance cohesion are
summarized, as follows:
a. Ideology defines the foundation of an alliance,
rationalizing the need for its existence. Nationalist or
associationist approaches to ideology define the nature
of relations within the alliance.
b. Beyond ideological precepts, alliances are guided by
formal agreements, tacit accords, as well as formal and
informal consultations.
c. Internal and external pressures dictate states’ actions,
elaborated by their commitment to the cause of an
alliance.
d. When a member-state fails to perform its functions
within the alliance due to pressures or fear thereof,
other members can exert pressure by realigning
themselves within the alliance, and therefore, posing a
threat of isolation to a deviant state.
As a sum, cohesion of alliances is a diplomatic
matter far more refined than any relations among the
adversaries, requiring diplomatic balance and skill for lasting
prosperity of the union.
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LISKA’S THEORY ON EFFICACY OF ALLIANCES
“To be efficacious, alliance policy must fit the prevailing
environment and the trends perceptible in it”1, said George Liska
in his assessment of the contemporary international system.
More or less, this judgment establishes and defines the
practical side of Liska’s theoretical foundations of alliance
efficacy.

His discussion of alliance efficacy particularly

targets defensive alliances (as opposed to alliances formed for
possible aggressive action), and examines the conditions, which
dictate the way allies deter the common enemy, control the
measure of the conflict, as well as restrain and coerce each
other2.
As discussed previously, reasons for alignment and
ideological underpinnings will include joint capacities and
increased capabilities, which in turn would serve to promote
alliance cohesion.

However commonsense those may be, the author

warns of the counter-effects of such ideological approaches as
prohibitive of any alternative measures of achieving their goals
of national security (whether, in alternative arrangements, or
on their own)3.

Another externality of excessive measures of

cohesion would manifest itself in decreasing national ‘face

1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p.
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value’ in the international political arena: bloc-voting in the
UN on matters other than the immediate security concerns of the
alliance would make the best example.

The concerns of military

integration versus independence dominated the political
discourse among Western allies, challenging standing
understandings regarding the level of involvement among allies
and their capacity for individual actions, when national
interests prevail.

Nonetheless, Liska outlines three particular

areas, which could be successfully integrated without entirely
limiting individual national interests:
a. Military field command, coordinated through mutual
consultation among allies.
b. Transportation, communication, and logistics facilities,
once again, ruled by mutual consultation and command.
c. At last, specialization in individual contributions to
the joint effort, to the best of nations’ abilities1.
The author also underscores the importance for mutual
consultation in strategy development among nations, drafting
premises for evaluating measures of cooperation in the face of
judging policy decisions.

The characteristics, favored as

cohesive factors, seemingly falter before the challenges of the

1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p.
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modern day diplomatic status quo.

Size of alliances seems to

matter less than their capacity for efficient operation,
national self-assertion among allies, as well as their ability
to be flexible in realizing their strategic goals as a part of
the alliance.

In a sense, where a realist approach sees the

modern system as restrictive towards choices of alignment (few
powers to align to), it gives way to intra-alliance flexibility,
in regards to carrying out internal goals.

Liska coins that

particular approach as ‘selective or dual-purpose integration’,
attributing to it greater capacity, simply because allies are
driven to act together not because they absolutely must, but
because they wish to do so1.

Thus, the level of commitment

towards a common goal, as well as level of alliance integration
serves to control the span of potential or existing conflicts,
as well as the adversary.

Selective integration operates in

select periods of activity, and can become an effective
deterrent, demonstrating the ability of allies to raise levels
of commitment, depending on the intensity of the conflict.
Moreover, such matters serve to prolong the life of an alliance,
giving it temporal durability in the face of conflict, and
provocations from an adversary.

1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p.
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Efficacy of dual-purpose integration is furthermore
promoted by the arrangement’s ability to serve as an intraalliance restraint, covering all three matters of alliance
restraining function (adversary, conflict, and allies).
Although formal provisions for consultation prior to conflict
escalation have been common among allies, allowing foreign bases
on national soil served as an efficient means of restraint among
allies.

Oftentimes, by imposing limits on numbers of foreign

troops on its soil, a state can control its fellow allies’
ability to escalate a conflict with an adjacent nation.
Although it does seem like a far cry from effective conflict
prevention, and may give way to dissent among alliance members,
military base regulations may compel compromises, strategic
consultation, and restraint within an alliance.
Overall, the efficacy of alliances is a multifaceted
matter, outlining alliance functions in regards to restraint of
the adversary, conflict, and fellow allies, but it could be
summarized in three of Liska’s precepts:
a. Alliances deter common adversaries by practicing
flexibility, and protecting national interests on
the world scale.

Flexibility and durability of any

alliance could be a successful deterrent in its own
right.
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b. States limit the scope of the conflict by deterring
the adversary, as well as by effectively deterring
other members of an alliance from escalating the
conflict by means of consultation, compromise, and
coercion.
c. States channel the actions of other member-states
through controlling the amount of commitment to a
particular issue, managing military resources, and
contributing to joint military goals.
Having discussed the issues of alliance alignment,
cohesion, and functional efficacy, it would be best suited to
observe George Liska’s theoretical principles for alliance
dissolution.

After all, the volatile nature of modern day

political systems serves to showcase best that dissent among
members and potential dissolution may face just about any
arrangement, regardless of speculated levels of commitment, and
similarity in ideological constraints.

GEORGE LISKA ON ALLIANCE DISSOLUTION
The decrease in cohesion among allies due to the advances
in warfare (less dependence on other allies) did not bring about
the expected outcomes of multipolarization.

In effect, the

claims for multipolarity could be attributed to the changing
42

political situation, which somewhat decreased military
dependence among allies, however, Liska states that “adversary
alliance systems remain the key factors in the contemporary
international system”1.

In many respects, Liska’s analysis of

the contemporary politics could be attributed to the nature of
IR politics in the 1960’s, when his work was published; however,
stipulations of future outcomes among alliances in the 1960’s
outline his premises for alliance de-alignments in general.

As

a comparative examination of the Warsaw Pact and western
alliances, Liska stresses the important capacity of Western
allies to find premises for existence beyond those of the
autocratic ideological character2.

That attribute could also be

added to the ability of Western nations to integrate their
military capabilities in the field – a feat that was
unsuccessful among Eastern allies.

Therefore, the comparison

underscores the ability of Western nations to follow the
doctrine of alliance alignment and formation: the ability to
evenly or justly distribute gains and responsibilities.

Thus,

an alliance (no matter how strong it is ideologically) may
suffer debilitating strains, or even disintegrate, when
distribution of gains and responsibilities no longer stays even.
When the situation is further complicated by internal restraints
1
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among allies, and the balance of gains to responsibilities in
thrown off, the organization will face a serious crisis1.

The

crisis, furthermore, could take several different patterns:
a. If the major restraining force or actor is the core
power, that power may have to relax the restraints, or
face the restrained nation’s ‘shake off’ of the
restraints through the balance of military capabilities.
b. The ensuing international conflict (followed by
relaxation of restraints) may be enough to cool off a
deviating ally.

If the ally pursues the conflict,

rupture or complications are imminent.
c. If the adversary is not attractive to the restrained
state, a conflict will take toll on both the core power
and the restrained power. If the adversary has some
means of attracting the lesser power, it is unlikely to
sacrifice its national security to the strains of the
restrictive alliance2.
As a result of his analysis of the Western and Eastern
alliance systems, George Liska concludes that alliances in
future diplomatic relations would face the need to accommodate
growing national capacities, and find means of relieving strains
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and controls among their fellow member-states without exerting
rupturing force, which can bring about dealignment.

On the

other hand, relaxation of ties between allies should not allow
the adversary to be able to divide and alienate them for the
sake of future conflicts1.

CRITICAL REVIEW OF GEORGE LISKA’S THEORY
Although the systemic-realist theory of George Liska was by
far one of the most well developed, and reflective theories of
its time, the academic community of IR scholars continued the
elaboration of his premises, as well as the creation of new
ideas on the subject.

A prime example of such elaboration came

in the shape of a growing debate about the nature of realism,
and the diverging paths that neorealism and postclassical
realism takes.

Although this debate does not directly focus on

the specific aspects of alliance formation and alignments, it
does weigh heavily on the issues of state roles and views, and
their resulting actions in the world arena.
An article by Stephen G. Brooks published in 1997 in
International Organization summarizes the key ideas of this

1
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dispute among scholars.

First and foremost, Brooks

differentiates between the two branches of realism by explaining
how conflict conditions state actions: in the case of
postclassical realism, states’ actions are believed to be
conditioned by the probability of aggression, whereas in the
case of neorealism, the same actions are conditioned by the
possibility of conflict.

In addition, differences exist

regarding the precepts of temporal constraints on state
decisions: neorealists argue that states, conditioned by their
worst-case scenario decision-making, prefer short-term military
concentration, and base their decisions on those short term
goals; postclassical realists, on the other hand, see the tradeoffs of short-term and long-term effects, and interchange them
equally.

Finally, the pessimistic approach to decision-making,

favored by the neorealists, contends that military preparedness
will always dominate the policy-making process. Postclassical
realists argue, however, that states weigh the risks associated
with potential security losses versus economic gains, and make
rational choices accordingly.1
In a nutshell, this serves to illustrate that Liska’s
theory, which focuses so heavily on security risks and threats

1
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(Summer 1997), pp. 446-447
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strictly follows the neorealist path, omitting the detailed
analysis and explanation of economic principles in alliance
formation and alignment.

In addition, such differentiation

between the two branches of realism alone poses an interesting
dilemma: can one single theory of alignment be applied to such a
dynamic environment, or can this divergence serve as an
explanation of a multi-systemic structure of European allied
governance, manifested through the co-existence of the European
Union and NATO?
Game theories, used by William Riker and Glenn Snyder,
sought to illustrate the process that states go through, in
search of security, trading off for potential encroachment by
the allies.

Nonetheless, Stephen M. Walt in The Origins of

Alliances debated the reliability of their arguments, reflecting
on the Snyder’s and Riker’s neglect of geographical and
ideological factors in their pay-off analysis.1
In a sense, Walt sought to further elaborate Liska’s aging
theory in a publication, which would be more reflective of the
recent political structures and behavior.

Walt examines the

alignment and alliance formation as a result of two different
motions and initiatives by the actor-states.

Alliance building,

as a balancing behavior, could be seen as an explanation,
1
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similar to Liska’s concepts of balance of power.

On the other

hand, Walt further elaborates on state behavior by introducing
the concept of bandwagoning behavior, which he explains by the
attractions of strength and potential spoils, where states join
either for the sake of conciliation, or in hopes of potential
gains. In addition, ideological initiatives may impose catalytic
effects on alignment of weaker states to a stronger state, where
the social and ideological structure of the state is easily
penetrable1. To a degree, this may serve to explain the behavior
of the states within NATO, if one were to juxtapose their level
of cohesion to the principles of the alliance and their social
and ideological penetrability.
In a sense, the greatest challenge of this research topic
was to focus on the ability to explain the existing conditions,
without practical potential to forecast the future developments
in theory, as a result of world events.

Michael P. Sullivan, in

Theories of International Relations, writes:
Theory and ‘real world’ constantly badger and hound
each other, the former straining to corral the latter,
and the latter racing away, producing a necessary

1
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tension in an ‘interactive’ mode because both
dimensions…are dynamic1.
Being able to find the fine balance within this work between the
numerous theoretical constraints and real world facts would mark
the ability to test the hypothetical questions for either
success or failure.

1

See Michael P. Sullivan, Theories of International Relations, (New York: Palgrave,
2001), p. 16

49

CHAPTER 4: THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION -ROOTS OF AN ALLIANCE

Considering the turmoil of the 20th century international
relations and diplomacy, few would disagree that no alliance or
alignment has proven more enduring than the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO).

Established in mid-20th century, the

alliance has seen its share of internal and external pressures,
but has maintained and even expanded its power over the years.
That survival has served as a factor for attracting numbers of
scholars, seeking to explain the shifting character of NATO.
The years following the end of World War II were filled
with challenges and tribulations for all parties to the
conflict.

The victors buried their dead and struggled to

rebuild whatever was left of their shattered infrastructures.
Solidarity in victory gave hope for new beginnings in diplomatic
relations between countries, which were on the opposite sides of
the ideological sphere. Those hopes were short lived. In Europe,
external pressures for formation of a defensive alliance
developed at a frightening pace. Following disagreements over
zones of influence in post-war Germany, it became painfully
evident that the path chosen for post-war development by the
Soviet Union was far different from those of its former Western
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allies.

The expansionist ideological policies of the Soviet

Communist Party, and the control that it had imposed on its
Eastern European neighbors generated well-grounded fears in
regards to Soviet Western expansion into the North-Atlantic
states.
As a result, five Western European nations (Belgium,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom)
settled on establishing a common defense system, and
furthermore, promoting their international ties in economic,
political, and cultural spheres, which would allow them to
resist Eastern ideological, political, and military threats1.
The effective starting point for this alignment was formalized
in the March 1948 Treaty of Brussels, which brought up adding
seven other nations (Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Norway,
the United States, and Canada) into this budding alliance. This
was finally formalized in April 1949 in the Treaty of
Washington, which effectively secured the North Atlantic
European and North American community from the threat of Soviet
aggression.

Turkey and Greece entered into the Treaty in 1952,

shortly followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. The
commitment was to distribute the benefits and responsibilities
of collective security among member-states.
1

Furthermore, the

The historical background of the NATO inception and development was obtained from
the lastest edition of the NATO Handbook (See NATO Office of Information and Press,
NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), ch. 1-2)
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treaty restricted those states from entering any other alliances
or agreements, which would conflict with the interests of this
newly-established union1.
The basis for the establishment of the alliance has been
discussed in its historical context. However, from the
perspective of theoretical means, the contributors to the
alliance sought to create a universal security establishment,
which would reach farther than that of just an anti-Soviet
security blanket. Specifically, the NATO Handbook avers that
“[t]he fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a
common commitment to mutual cooperation among the member states,
based on the indivisibility of their security”2.

The

affirmations of mutual security, nonetheless, include individual
sovereignty, and the freedom of the states, and establish mutual
security guarantees in the meantime.

Having established the

conditions for cooperation among the members, NATO found it
essential to move on to the discussion of the principles of
mutual cooperation among member-states, by focusing on the
benefits, responsibilities, and mechanisms of cooperation.
Although the NATO Handbook appears to be one of the most
exhaustive publications on the matters of the alliance, the
North Atlantic Treaty of April 4th, 1949 is the cornerstone for
1

See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001),
30
2
Ibid, p. 30
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pp. 29-

all NATO publications, which introduces one to the principles of
this organization.

The document consists of 14 articles, which

discuss the official bases for alliance formation, goals,
responsibilities, and cooperation.
First and foremost, the Treaty requires all of its
undersigned members to the best of their ability to resolve all
of their international conflicts through peaceful means, thus
avoiding the danger of armed confrontation, as well as promote
the ideological understanding of their democratic processes, as
a means for promoting international stability.

Second, the

treaty categorically states that consultation among parties is
required, when there is a credible threat to territorial
security of any of the alliance members.

Third, the Treaty

obliges its parties to take part in individual or collective use
of force, when armed attack on any of its parties occurs,
however, the Treaty does indicate that the UN Security Council
shall have ultimate power over any security matters in the
region.

Fourth, the Treaty establishes its priority over any

previous arrangements between members and third parties, as well
as bars its members from entering into any arrangements, which
may potentially hinder its operation.

And at last, the Treaty

establishes a mechanism for its revision (10-year waiting
period, following its ratification), and for official detachment
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of its members (following a 20-year waiting period from the
Treaty’s ratification), as elaborated in the Treaty’s text.
Further elaboration of NATO’s foundation is available in the
NATO Handbook, which addresses the concerns discussed in the
North Atlantic Treaty as those of mutual security, consultation,
deterrence, and defense1.

The inter-governmental structures of

the alliance (i.e. The North Atlantic Council, The Defense
Planning Committee, etc.) were charged with the important task
of carrying out those goals through constant consultation,
coordination, and democratic means, and the nature of those
establishments is dictated purely by their purpose.
Security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is
perceived as a matter far more complex than simple preservation
of members’ sovereignties. Essentially, the interpretation of
security by NATO members is that of mutual stability,
transparency and understanding among them, which in turn
decreases potential threats from outside coercion or influence.
Achievement of the security objectives is seen as a matter of
effective crisis management, and far-reaching partnerships in
various spheres2. Consultation (a matter so closely examined as a
tool of efficacy by George Liska), as a means for extended
cooperation and mutual assurance of collective defense terms, is
1
2

See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), pp. 31-32
Ibid, p. 32
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seen as an essential method for avoiding conflict among members,
when defense and deterrence agreements need to be made. Over the
period of five decades, the structure of the alliance has grown
more complex, yet the primary goals for their existence remained
similar.

DECONSTRUCTING THE PRE-NATO ALIGNMENT
Not considering all of the policy and structural
permutations that took place within the alliance in the postSoviet period, NATO was, in fact, a near-perfect example of
Liska’s theory in action.

Here, the questions of ‘why?’, ‘how

strong?’ and ‘with whom?’ in regards to alignments in Western
Europe of the post-World War II era clearly indicate that
objective alliance principles apply. If one dissects the
alignment, cohesion, and efficacy factors and variables, the
nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization falls well
within the dogmas of objective alliance theory almost perfectly.
Alignment of the future members could be seen as a textbook
example of balancing of power within the region.

In his

introduction to reasoning on power-balance alignments George
Liska states that “no abstract criterion can supply reliable
guidance in either making or analyzing alignments without
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reference to concrete conditions and conflicts”1. Considering the
expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, following the
division of post-war Germany, such conditions can be easily
identified as a catalytic factor for pre-NATO alignment.
The matter of maximizing gains and sharing liabilities in
national security matters of participating members echoes in the
NATO Handbook’s chapter on Fundamental Security Tasks of the
alliance: “NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom
and security of all its members by political and military
means…”2, as well as “[t]he fundamental principle underpinning
the Alliance is a common commitment to mutual cooperation among
member states, based on the indivisibility of their security”3.
Here, the excerpt from the NATO Handbook echoes some of the
workings of the ‘gains-liabilities’ model: in particular, the
existence of protective mechanisms, addressing the primary
objective (protection), as well as an allusion to cooperation
for the greater good, which, undeniably, aims at addressing
issues of regional stability, and wide-scale pooling of
resources. That shifts the focus from the reasons for the
alignment, towards the mechanisms of the impending organization.
It is now a matter of addressing how strong this alliance should
be, as well as which members the alliance should include. The
1
2
3

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 26
See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 30
Ibid, p. 30.
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question of how much alliance cohesion is considered necessary,
in order for it to fulfill its purpose thereafter would allow
for a test of the feasibility of George Liska’s theory with a
50-year run of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Factors of gains and liabilities serve as prime indicators
of the strength of aligning factors, since the higher level of
security, economic, and geopolitical gains would always lead to
a stronger alliance than a lower level, according to objectivist
alliance theory. Addressing the issues of gains and liabilities
Liska writes: “Stability is threatened by material and political
burdens and strains flowing from alliance, while gains consist
in economies pooling of resources and in material and moral
supports by allies”1.
The forefathers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
have addressed this matter on several fronts.

Certainly, the

matters of economic gains and provision of economic stability,
based upon those of collective regional defense are selfevident; however, the matters of liabilities are delicately
addressed as to allow the participants in this organization the
flexibility of political choice and participation, which would
assure a reduction in material and political burdens, as
discussed by Liska. Here, the focus of the NATO principles

1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 30
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shifts towards a democratically open model: “It is an
intergovernmental organization, in which member countries retain
their full sovereignty and independence”1, as well as “[t]he
resulting sense of equal security among the members of the
Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in
their national military capabilities, contributes to stability
in the Euro-Atlantic area”2.
However, the alignment that led up to the formation of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization cannot provide us with
sufficient detail, explaining the enforcement mechanisms within
the alliance, but can serve as a helpful indicator of strength
of the intent among the future members to form this alliance.
Practically speaking, the origins of the alliance could not
describe the ensuing mechanism that endured far past its
intended lifetime.
The matters of gains and liabilities that were established
as a part of the Treaty of Washington have been foreshadowed by
the Treaty of Brussels, which was signed a year prior between
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain3.
Here, the groundwork has been established by declaring the
parties willingness to seek cooperation in matters of
democratic, political, and socio-cultural development.
1
2
3

A model

See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 31
Ibid, p. 31
Ibid, p. 20-26
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for military cooperation between the Treaty members, and
principles of subordination to the UN Security Council were
later borrowed and expanded for its inclusion into the Treaty of
Washington. The checks-and-balances mechanisms of consultation
(Consultative Council), and response to military aggression were
adopted as well.
To a large extent, the circumstance, which led to the
alignment of states towards co-operation and signing of the 1949
Treaty of Washington, and the required gains as well as the
capability to carry the load of responsibilities, established
the candidacy of future members in the alliance.

The

participants of the Treaty of Brussels have understood the
necessity for a defensively stronger alliance, since the threat
of the Soviet expansion was far greater, and the force far more
formidable, than their initial goals of curbing any possible
future German aggression.

In that sense, the United States

became a pivoting point for the organization of what has become
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Certainly, the United

States were not the only member to complete this expansion of
the Treaty of Brussels (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway,
and Portugal completed the expansion).

However, U.S. military

capabilities, coupled with its new nuclear weapon capacity, and
expansive resource base made U.S. participation eminent.
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In addition, if we follow through with Liska’s principles
of alignment to a core power, Liska’s model requires the
existence of a conflict between the threat and a core power, so
that weaker states find sufficient cause for a move towards a
restrictive union.

In the case of the Treaty of Brussels, Great

Britain could be seen as the core power, with the majority of
the mainland European participants in the union still rebuilding
following the war. The conflict over the division of control
over the post-war Germany, as well as the provocative Soviet
chess game in Eastern Europe proved to be a sufficient enough
cause to shift the role of the core power towards the United
States.

In addition, the conflict between the two core world

ideologies (democratic and Communist) created a rivalry of
global proportions, making the conflict (in terms of Liska’s
theory) a dominant one, first on regional, and later on a global
scale.
Having discussed the matters leading up to the signing of
the Treaty of Washington, as well as the factors which
influenced the character of the organization that formed as a
result, allow me to examine the matters of cohesion and efficacy
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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NATO’S INSTRUMENTS OF COHESION AND ADVANCEMENT OF COMMON
INTERESTS
Generally, the matters that serve as aligning factors among
nations tend to carry their weight towards promoting alliance
cohesion.

Here, a growing antagonism between former wartime

allies was rooted deeply in ideological terms, and disagreements
over the spoils of the war.

The bonds that existed and were

strengthened between the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United
States, and Great Britain during their meeting in Yalta were no
match for ideological disparities of the post-war period.
Growing anti-Communist sentiment was fueled by the division of
Germany, and the Soviet ideological and military expansion into
Eastern Europe.

Here, the ideological differences between the

East and the West acted as a catalyst for search of common
interests among those with similar ideological understandings.
Therefore, Liska’s primary factor for alliance cohesion-that being rationalization, on ideological grounds1--appears
early in NATO’s history.

The matters of ideology are pre-

eminent in NATO’s purpose to such an extent, that their
importance is reflected within the first few lines of the Treaty
of Washington, as a part of its preamble.

The preamble assures

that parties to the Treaty of Washington intend to live in peace

1

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 61
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with other nations and “are determined to safeguard their
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and
the rule of law”1.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Liska’s

understanding of ideology is not only that of ties that bind,
but also that of measures taken to turn an alliance into a
‘living’ social institution, which may relieve some of the
burdens, imposed by the alliance, and create a wider
justification for uniting against a common threat2.
By encouraging and promoting open political dialogue among the
members of the alliance, as well as strengthening of sociocultural and economic ties, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization intended not only to promote stability based on
common ideological principles, but also to offset the
liabilities of being a part of this alliance by expanding the
range and nature of its gains.

By establishing a Council with

equal representation for members, the Treaty of Washington
utilized the ideological principles that its signatories set out
to protect, thus promoting ideological causes even further.
Ideological constraints were made strong for a number of
reasons.

First of all, the allies established the reason for

cooperation between each other.
1
2

This proved to be beneficial to

See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 527
See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 62
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the good of the alliance from two perspectives: stronger allies
received reassurance that the weaker allies would adhere to
their commitment, as long as their national democratic process
prevailed, whereas the weaker allies were safeguarded against
the possible hegemony by stronger allies through democratic
checks and balances.

Second of all, the participants’ reliance

on democratic principles that found its reflection in the 11th
Article of the Treaty of Washington secured the United States as
a major ally by giving national democratic processes an upper
hand over commitments to the Treaty:

“This Treaty shall be

ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes”1.

In

a manner, that stance provided leeway for America’s usual
isolationist tactics, and allowed greater solidarity among
allies. The United States tried its utmost to transfer the
majority of liabilities associated with this new alliance to
Western European shoulders2.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the United States led
the way in promoting creation of West German armed forces, as an
attempt at decreasing their share of the burden.

Such armed

forces generated ferocious opposition from the European side,
particularly, at the hands of France. However, after a number of
1

See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 529
See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 29
2
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revisions, the framework for a restricted West German army was
devised, and later ratified.

By the beginning of the 1950’s,

the Western European community strengthened their mutual
defenses by inviting Greece and Turkey into the union.

Uneasy

and reluctant first steps establishing the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization turned into a firm commitment from all of its
participants in great part due to rising tensions between the
Communist and the democratic world.

The Soviet interventions in

Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and – later - in Afghanistan served to
strengthen the Parties’ resolve, and commitment to common goals.
The issue of nuclear deterrence, oftentimes overlooked as a
cohesive factor, played an integral part in the alliance’s
development.

David Yost’s NATO Transformed touches upon this

issue: “[A] primary issue throughout the Cold War was the
credibility of what came to be known as U.S. ‘extended
deterrence’”1.

As opposed to ‘central deterrence’ (or deterrence

of threat to the U.S. itself), ‘extended deterrence’ was based
upon the notion that U.S. nuclear capability, coupled with the
nation’s commitment to the Treaty of Washington would curb any
threats of aggression or coercion against U.S. allies in the
face of possible U.S. nuclear retaliation.

Although, the

multilateral nuclear cutbacks of the early 1990’s limited the
1

See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 32-33
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type of European-based nuclear munitions to gravity bombs,
extended deterrence still serves as a valuable cohesive factor
within NATO.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, theoretically,
alliance cohesion is a matter of ideological foundations,
diplomatic agreements and accords, and the balance of gains and
liabilities.

Therefore, the ideological foundations, reinforced

by Soviet expansionist tactics served as the primary cohesive
factor.

Provisions of Article 11 (‘provisions carried out by

Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes’) of the Treaty reduced the liabilities.

Alliance

gains, sought in collective defense, were secured in Article 5:
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense … will assist the Party or
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith…such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”1.
All of the aforementioned facts meet and exceed Liska’s
expectations for alliance cohesion.

1

The Treaty of Washington

See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 528
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was composed in perfect balance, and succeeded in establishing a
lasting union of mutually-involved nations, based upon
principles of solidarity and democracy.

PRINCIPLES OF EFFICACY IN NATO’S OPERATIONAL STRATEGY
NATO’s strength and operational efficacy as a defensive
alliance greatly supports the notions put forth in Liska’s work.
Particularly, the counter-effects of cohesive factors have
become self-evident over a period of years.

The scholar’s

observation, regarding the decrease in national identity of
nations involved in highly structured and cohesive alliances
manifested itself in NATO’s UN voting practices, and other world
matters.

In part, such behavior became an indicator of

solidarity among the allies on world matters, but on the other,
served as a sign of subtle coercive pressure from the core
power’s side.
Such a coercive push, as you may recall, set in motion a
number of activities within NATO’s early history. In many ways,
there were attempts by the United States to shift its share of
the burden further onto Europe’s shoulders.

To some extent,

such U.S. behavior echoed its traditional isolationist policies,
but largely reflected the US domestic political attitudes
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towards any substantial involvement into the alliance.

David

Yost, in his recollection of NATO’s early years, quotes
Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s response to the Senate
committee hearing on whether there would be substantial material
commitment by the US to European collective defense: “The answer
to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute ‘No’”1.

Such

a climate, certainly, supported any existing conception of
national freedom to make sovereign choices and decisions in
matters of foreign policy.
However typical those notions have been, the mood changed
with the 1950 North Korean invasion, which was seen as nothing
less than another Soviet expansionist move.

The political shift

brought about organizational changes among new allies. The
proposal by the United States of the European Defense Community
(finally established in 1954), as well as Dwight Eisenhower’s
appointment as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe were
the first steps in establishing efficacious organizational
structures within NATO2.
Liska’s theory on alliance efficacy outlines three key
areas of integration, which have little interference with
national interests of alliance parties: military field command,
transportation and logistics, and individual specialization of
1

See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 29
2
See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p 26.
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member-nations1.

In a sense, the integration of military

resources was the primary item on the agenda of this defensive
alliance. For this purpose, the Military Committee was formed,
which included Military Representatives (acting on behalf of
respective Chiefs of Defense, who constitute the highest
military representative level in NATO) from all participating
member-states.

The responsibilities of the Military Committee

include making decisions with regards to defense issues, and
recommending defensive strategies and plans of action to NATO’s
Strategic Commanders in NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe2. Military and civil subordination within NATO is
highly reflective of the goals and principles indicated in the
Treaty of Washington.

In particular, the structural dependence

on the power of national authorities underscores any
organizational behavior within the alliance.

According NATO’s

civil and military structure, the national authorities have the
ultimate say in all final policy decisions of the alliance’s
councils and committees, as reflected in the illustration below3.

1
2
3

See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 118
See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), pp. 239-240
Ibid, p. 517
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Figure 1 NATO’s Civil and Military Structure

Streamlining of the policy decisions from specialized
committees to national authorities became the first symbol of
NATO’s efficacy in performance of its primary duties.
Matters of logistics, transportation, and material support
were addressed through the organization of centralized means of
material distribution and coordination.

NATO Maintenance and

Supply Organization, and its Agency carry responsibility of
managing armaments supplies and matters of maintenance in
collective Allied arsenals.

Linked with a number of groups and

organizations, which are responsible for matters of military and
production logistics, air defense and traffic management,
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communication, electronic warfare, meteorology, education, and
research and development, that portion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization ensures that the efforts of collective
defense are well backed and its supply lines are wellcoordinated1.

In a very direct way, such integration of

defensive and diplomatic efforts within the alliance is a good
demonstration of Liska’s principles of ‘dual-purpose
integration’2.

Here, the alliance members choose to act

together, and are not driven to collective action through some
sort of a coercive conflict.

Through provision of instruments

of consultation, such a system imposes democratic checks-andbalances upon its participants, thus limiting the scale and
number of potential regional conflicts, and, nonetheless, offers
quick reaction means for defensive cooperation, should the need
arise.
Efficacy of any alliance is judged by its capacity to deter
aggressive or coercive action by its adversary.

As mentioned in

the previous chapter, flexibility and durability of any alliance
can serve as a successful deterrent, and therefore,
establishment of flexible and durable organizational structures
is paramount not only to the survival of an alliance, but also
to its deterrence potential.

In this matter, the North Atlantic

1

See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 305
See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p.
134
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Treaty Organization overcame all odds.

The limitations of the

democratic checks-and-balances imposed by the consulting bodies,
and ultimately, restricted by the national authorities
effectively deter and coerce any members of NATO from escalating
any external or internal conflicts. The best example of such
operation would be the mitigation of the conflict between Greece
and Turkey over Cyprus.
However complex the structure of NATO’s operational
mechanism may be, it has been constructed with durability and
flexibility in mind, yet provides enough leeway for successful
conflict mitigation.

In terms of Liska’s tools of alliance

efficacy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents a
diplomatic success story.
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CHAPTER 5: THE BEGINNINGS OF TRANSFORMATION

The materials leading up to this point were concerned with
outlining the theoretical background behind NATO’s inception,
cohesion, and efficacy, as well as its historical premises and
organizational principles.

This chapter examines the

transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its
parts, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and to
apply the same theoretical principles to the newly-transformed
structure, in order to test their applicability.
The post-Soviet capitalist world has experienced a major
change in its security concerns, as well as shifts in its
diplomatic posture.

Many policy analysts argue that the world

has finally entered a transitional phase, when force is no
longer a prevailing factor, and the rule of law is used to
resolve any or all disputes and disagreements.

As an example of

such shift, supporters of that theory cite the Maastricht Treaty
of 1991, as the first step towards true European unification,
whether in political, defensive, or economic matters. In a
sense, that view displaces the Realist perspective, which
insists that security and balance of power concerns are
necessary, in order to maintain the status quo in contemporary
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foreign policy1.

Particularly, the article by Robert J. Art

stresses the tacit understanding among leaders of Western
European nations that NATO is needed as a balancing and
restrictive tool for parties in the alliance.

The unification

of Germany and its rapid economic growth raised concerns within
the German government, regarding possible reaction against
Germany by its neighbors (perhaps, an intra-NATO balancing
realignment), as commented on by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
in 19952.

That particular comment convinced Art that Realist

matters of power balance and security are still very pertinent
in contemporary European politics3.

Art’s take on such

unification moves, as debates on plausibility of the European
Political Union (EPU) or the European Defense Identity (EDI) is
clear: they only prove that European dependence on the unified,
yet pluralistic security community is a manifestation of the
European elites’ fear of disintegration of internal security
arrangements.

After all, history shows that the general efforts

of the United States to unify Europe, for the sake of the
greater good and economic ‘better’, served well to construct a
balanced and secure Western European community, one which was
1
See Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 111-1 (Spring, 1996), p. 1
2
R. Art quoting Helmut Kohl: “Germany’s dominance would necessarily provoke fear and
envy among all our neighbors and move them toward common action against Germany”, “Why
Western Europe Needs United States and NATO”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111-1,
(Spring 1996), p. 2.
3
Ibid, p. 2
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previously riddled with nationalism and multilateral foreign
policy initiatives.

On the other hand, since the mission of

NATO was to curb potential Soviet aggression towards the West,
it has accomplished far more. It has created an internal bond
and regulation, like that of a collective security arrangement,
designed to mitigate conflicts between involved parties1. From
the standpoint of Edwin Fedder, in his book NATO: The Dynamics
of Alliance in the Postwar World, the unique nature of the
alliance created benefits and gains for all parties involved,
including the U.S., which benefited from a stable a loyal
Western European community.
Although, it would be foolhardy to assume that years of
peaceful co-existence between such neighbors as France and
Germany would immediately revert to nationalist violence, in the
event of US withdrawal of its European presence.

What does

become possible, according to Art, is a spreading
multilateralism in numerous areas of previous
cooperation. This would lead to nothing less than the wasteful
expenditure of national funds plus reversion to regional power
politics2.

Thus, the entire principle of indivisibility of

1

See Edwin H. Fedder, NATO: The Dynamics of Alliance in the Postwar World. (New York:
Dodd, Mead & Co., 1973), p. 2
2
See Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 111-1 (Spring, 1996), p. 5
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regional security is abandoned, unless a core power from outside
the region is present.
This is a paradox in itself, yet a paradox, for which there
exists an explanation.

First, the Realist perspective on

importance of national security is apt, if one considers the
historical prevalence of nationalist power plays in Western
Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Second, the
concepts of alliance cohesion and efficacy outlined by Liska
find their niche in the contemporary European environment.
Although, the matters of deterrence of outside threats still
exist, the issues of internal balancing and alignment take
charge.

Where initially, NATO’s role as a Western European

security blanket prevailed, this laid a foundation of continuing
diplomacy for promoting continuing solidarity beyond the
existence of a common threat.

If one were to agree with such

scholars as Robert Art, then Europe needs NATO now just as much
as it did in 1949.

To a very large extent, such a view supports

traditional Realist view on alliances, although it shifts the
focus from the existing arrangements from external threats to
internal diplomacy.

In addition, the theories put forth by

Stephen Walt suggest that the mere perception of possible danger
can be a cohesive or aligning factor.

Sean Kay writes on NATO’s

persistence: “Fear of instability and the unknown can be as much
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a unifying factor as a clear and present danger.”1

Here, once

again fears of instability due to the growing influence of a
united Germany come into play, while inclusion of some Central
and Eastern European nations into NATO is seen as balancing
Germany’s influence.
As an addition to the Realist emphasis on the importance of
security as a strengthening factor, some analysts, such as
Robert McCalla, add additional factors, reinforcing the NATO’s
persistence following the demise of the Soviet threat.
Particularly, McCalla points out that for alliances with a high
organizational factor (such as NATO), the impact of a threat
disappearance would be mitigated, by the existence of an
organizational structure that supports the alliance.

In

addition, McCalla argues that the factors favoring dissolution
would also be mitigated if an alliance performs other functions
beyond its central goal of collective defense2.

Here, the author

makes the case for institutionalism and its prevalence in
contemporary international affairs: although NATO could happily
claim that it has accomplished its goal, while its members
expanded the range of their concerns, since there is the

1

See Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security. (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield Pub., 1998), p. 7
2
See Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International
Organization, Vol. 50-3 (Summer, 1996), p. 470
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possibility of utilizing a well-oiled and seasoned international
machine to deal with any new threats.
The argument suggests that NATO could utilize existing
methods and principles to deal with emerging security concerns,
re-organize (if necessary), in order to meet new requirements,
and use its diplomatic ‘weight’ in order to fulfill policy goals
in its interaction with other actors1.

Thus, the high degree of

organization and commitment to institutional principles becomes
a sure sign supporting NATO’s longevity.

In addition to the

institutional component of this theoretical approach, McCalla
proposes that a ‘regime’ nature of NATO’s external and internal
policy attitudes, which reduce parties’ costs and liabilities by
providing settled behavior patterns for all participating
members, could also be a contributing factor to the
organization’s durability2.
Although it would be quite early to reach a conclusion with
regards to NATO’s longevity, based upon a limited analysis of
theoretical assumptions of policy scholars, without any
practical assertions of their accuracy, those assumptions can be
summarized nonetheless.

As mentioned previously, in the

analysis of Liska’s theory, alliance characteristics are

1
See Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International
Organization, Vol. 50-3 (Summer, 1996), p. 464
2
Ibid, p. 462
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discussed according to its principles of alignment, cohesion,
and efficacy.
In this specific case, fears of internal re-alignment
become a critical matter for one of the allies, seeking to
maintain NATO presence in Europe as a balancing tool.

In

addition, efficient organizational and institutional parameters,
which were characterized in the previous chapter as signs of
flexibility and durability of the alliance, are present, thus
signifying that NATO was built to outlast its opponents. In
addition, members of NATO may find (as institutional theory
suggests) that maintaining, and restructuring the current union
may be less costly than organizing a completely new structure.
Therefore, theoretically, post-Soviet NATO is characterized by
issues of internal security fears, organizational stability and
durability, and, since internal security fears dictate a need
for such an arrangement, significant cost-benefit advantages
over completely new arrangements.
A new perspective on NATO’s organizational and
institutional character arises, as that of an international
institution, rather than simply a limited regional security
arrangement.

By characterizing the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization as a security institution rather than a security
arrangement, this places a more formal nature upon the
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organization’s practices, and generally identifies the
institution as the one responsible for the security of its
respective members.

Therefore, institutionalism establishes

NATO as a more long-lasting and encompassing arrangement than
the previously seen unilateral defensive arrangement.
This offers a conflicting view from a traditional Realist
approach, which considers institutional arrangements as more of
a secondary factor, rather than a primary contributing factor to
collective security. In lieu of power and economic competition
among alliance members, even the strongest of former allies may
come to odds on valid issues, which indicates that institutional
arrangements alone would not serve to prevent such conflicts.
However traditional that approach may be, proponents of
institutionalism suggest that the true value of international
institutions’ capacity to serve as a provision for international
security can be readily tested and proven: their worth as
security providers is assured by their establishment of norms of
international cooperation beyond traditional rule of power.
Historically, however, some of the most benignly conceived
institutions failed to protect their members from aggression
through collective action, the best example of that being the
League of Nations. This was exemplified by the failure of the
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organization to enforce its Articles upon Italy during the
Italo-Ethiopian crisis of 1934-351.
The nature of restructuring decisions within NATO,
following the end of the Cold War, led many analysts to believe
that the power of the institution was on the decline, as
evidenced by its ‘ad hoc responses to the changes in the
international environment’2.

The realist-institutionalist debate

permeates the post-Cold War nature of the alliance, perfectly
setting up the grounds for the analysis of its transformation.

THE TRANSFORMATION IN ACTION
David Yost dedicated his entire publication NATO
Transformed to NATO’s shift from traditional security
enforcement arrangement towards its new role in the future of
Europe.

Yost touches upon a number of similar concerns voiced

by a number of his colleagues following the end of the Cold War:
that of US involvement in the European security affairs, and
that of balancing Germany’s influence, as well as maintaining
interest in joint European defense planning, as opposed to
nationalist efforts. However, the bulk of his work is dedicated
1

See George Gill, The League of Nations: 1929-1946. (New York: Avery Pub., 1996), pp.
35-51.
2
See Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security. (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlfield Pub., 1998), p. 11

80

to NATO’s cooperation with Eastern European countries, matters
of peace and security maintenance within and outside the region,
as well as potential for the change in the nature of this
security arrangement.
Besides those primary goals, the leadership of the alliance
was faced with the collapse of the Soviet empire. It also sought
to drastically reorganize its internal structure, in order to
promote solidarity among the existing allies, as well as promote
the emergence of the European Security and Defense Identity.

A

greater level of flexibility was also sought: one aimed at
maintaining combat readiness in non-traditional NATO roles, such
as crisis management, and co-operation with non-NATO countries.1
Albeit such a shift in interests and structural
characteristics might seem surprising to some, it indicates a
number of very important movements, which took place within the
organization.

First and foremost, the move towards co-operation

with former enemies also aims to promote stability.

The

standoff between former adversaries would no longer have the
same effect that it did in the early years.

In addition, making

the friendly terms formal would establish an institutional
relationship between the alliance and numerous non-aligned
states.

Second, the shift in the alliance’s defensive role,

1

See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 72
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towards a peacekeeping and crisis-management model maintained
the pressure on the allies to continue the organization by redefining the security threat.

And at last, structural push for

solidarity and flexibility is aimed at promoting the alliance’s
durability, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, since
the staying power of the international organizations is very
often predicated on those simple characteristics.

Allow me to

elaborate on those matters.
For members of NATO, collaboration with Eastern European
nations signified a new phase of European development.

However

stable the Soviet Union could have seemed, its presence is no
longer a factor in NATO’s security policies, and prompted a
search for new definition for Europe’s vision of stability and
peace.

The general objectives of “just and lasting peaceful

order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees”1,
as addressed by the Harmel Report lost its mark, with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, re-unification of Germany, and
the process of democratization in Eastern Europe.
Seemingly, the number of opinions on the future of NATO
outnumbered the number of realistic solutions.

However, the

general attitude of solidarity prevailed: NATO could accomplish
the same feat of integration in Eastern Europe in the early
1

See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 92
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1990’s, as it had done in the Western Europe during the early
1950’s1.
Moreover, NATO members maintained their focus on their
traditional matters even more vigorously, curbing any
possibility that the disappearance of the collective threat may
allow the re-emergence of historical Western European power
arrangements.

Yost comments on this subject: “That the Allies

are in fact aware of such risks, intend to hedge against them,
and wish to sustain the Alliance’s traditional functions while
undertaking new missions has been evident”2.
For the first time, since the establishment of NATO in
1949, the Kantian formula of indivisible security re-emerged in
negotiations between Russia and NATO in 1997, aimed at grounding
that formula in common democratic values, norms, and
commitments3.

Organizations, such as the North Atlantic

Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace reached out
beyond NATO’s traditional scope of cooperation, providing
vehicles of collaboration for NATO members and their non-NATO
partners.

Among those organizations, the Partnership for Peace

(PfP) has seemingly reached its vast range of goals, which were

1

Yost on a comment made by Madeleine Albright, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New
Roles in International Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p.
92
2
Ibid, p. 93
3
See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 93
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not limited to simple defense cooperation, but also incorporated
humanitarian issues, as well as disaster management, and search
and rescue.
Nonetheless, NATO’s push for stability re-emerged once
more, when the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed its commitment
to consult on the matters of security with any PfP participant,
whenever there is a perceived direct threat to that partner’s
security or independence.

In practice, PfP was able to achieve

enormous levels of cooperation, including combat and crisis
readiness among the partners through logistical integration of
communications, collective defense planning, and burden sharing
among partners in the matters of bringing the new partners up to
the standard level of readiness.
Enlargement of NATO became the culmination of the efforts
of the alliance and the world community to promote stability in
Europe, as well as to promote cooperation among former
adversaries1.

Although the advocates of enlargement were highly

diverse, the general rationales for such a move were grounded in
promoting democracy in the reforming Eastern European community,
as well as establishing common standards for collective efforts
among former adversaries, in order to bring the latter to the
level of consultation, exemplified by their Western European
1

See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 92.
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counterparts.

However long-winded such analysis of NATO’s

efforts for cooperation with former enemies may be, only one
particular goal characterizes the alliance’s efforts: lasting
pan-European stability.
Although, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization as a deterrent of the Soviet aggression and
coercion became non-existent with the disappearance of the
Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation
remained a factor in reconfiguring the new security
arrangements.

Prior to that, alliance doctrine limited the

scope of NATO’s security engagement to the territories and
forces of the NATO members.

However, mainly due to the

disintegration of Yugoslavia, redefinition of that doctrine and
the limitations of NATO’s engagement occurred.

Particularly,

the focus has shifted towards establishing and maintaining
stability and security in Eastern and Central Europe, and
preventing any internal and external conflicts in the region.
The potential for an armed conflict growing beyond the borders
of the initial engagement, and spilling over into NATO
territories forced the change in NATO’s defensive strategies.
As a result of this policy shift, the alliance’s involvement in
the early 1990’s Yugoslavian crisis was the first actual test of
the new arrangement.

When all diplomatic attempts at containing
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and pacifying the conflict failed, NATO got involved in
establishing peace in former Yugoslavia in 1992.

Those efforts

were not simply directed at maintaining NATO’s prestige in the
eyes of the world community, but also became direct means for
the conflict containment and regional stabilization that has
been NATO’s forte for several decades, and now in a new era.
The role of Russian Federation in the conflict is
paramount.

In the earlier period of the conflict, Russian

policy indicated a full support of Western efforts in the
region. Swayed by internal pressures, the Russia’s accommodating
tone has changed to a neutral position, and established a proSerbian attitude1. Such likely shifts in Russia’s foreign policy
have prompted concern from the European community, and to some
extent, they allowed for a continuation of NATO’s role as a
balance-of-power mechanism.
When it became evident that crisis management and peace
operations were now the added challenge, NATO proceeded to reorganize its assets and structures into more flexible and
independent entities. In particular, the establishment of the
new Combined Joint Task Forces as an attempt to separate the
burdens of various engagements between allies and to avoid
maintaining a single complex system.
1

The key phrases have now

Roger E. Kanet, Edward A. Kolodziej. Coping with Conflict after the Cold War.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 60-61
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become “timely response” and “flexibility”, and “separable but
not separate military capabilities”1.
The growing desire among Western European nations (France,
in particular) to establish a European Security and Defense
Identity was an attempt to improve the balance of the EuropeanAmerican diplomatic relations. It has encountered a number of
hurdles, such as the lack of European logistical capabilities
and debates on the role of ESDI, most of which have already been
overcome by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This,

therefore, serves as an assurance that NATO has slowly, but
steadily assumed its new role as the guarantor of stability in
the European region, and possesses a greater capacity and
success potential than any of its potential successors.
However contentious the issue of NATO succession has been,
the prospects for further integration into the fabric of the
European community are positive from numerous perspectives: its
role as a balancing organization has effects internally as well
as externally. NATO is reforming to meet new security
challenges, and seeking to promote regional stability.

All of

those matters meet with various levels of support from a
majority of the participants in the debate over NATO’s
feasibility, its enlargement, and its future.
1

Gale Mattox, in

See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 201-202
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an essay analyzing the NATO debate, concludes: “Reaching out to
those countries not formally members, it has the ability to
stabilize and secure peace on the continent”1.
If NATO intends to follow through with its intended goals,
and faces its challenges, in spite of continuing criticism,
several different avenues for its efforts should be addressed.
Those encompass its reduced focus on collective defense matters,
continuing participation of the United States in European
affairs, understanding of limitations of NATO’s involvement in
collective defense affairs, and a clarification of NATO’s goals
while following the traditional defense doctrine, as well as the
new security track2.
To a large extent, the challenge of downgraded focus on
collective defense has been addressed.

In the absence of direct

threat, NATO leadership has successfully redefined the
alliance’s role in European stability.

However, the limitations

that the new threat of instability poses, in turn, impose limits
on the practical potential of members’ involvement in security
matters.

The best example of such limitations could be seen in

US reluctance regarding its initial ground involvement in the
Yugoslavian crisis.

In particular, that crisis indicates that

1

See Gale Mattox “New Realities, New Challenges,” in Enlarging NATO: The National
Debates, ed. Gale Mattox and Arthur Rachwald (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub., 2001), p.
255
2
See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 272
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the new doctrine, however current it may be, does not achieve
those solidarity levels reminiscent of the ones that
characterized the Soviet threat.

In that sense, the US role and

its level of involvement in NATO’s peacekeeping and crisis
management endeavors serves as an indicator of NATO’s future and
its capacity to uphold its goals, since intermittent and
reluctant participation of the US in those matters significantly
weakens the alliance.

Such reluctance could be drastically

reduced by clarifying the new divergence of doctrine foci,
prompted by the disappearance of the key threat, and confirming
new grounds for collective defense: those of European stability
in the face of the emergence of new nations; the potential for
the re-emergence of Western European power plays; and, future
need to perform potential collective defense functions.
Although the chance still stands that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization will go through substantial policy and structural
changes, in order to meet the new challenges, its steadfast
commitment to solidarity and cooperation in the European region
meets the current challenges head on.

David Yost confirms the

effectiveness and durability of the alliance in the conclusion
to his work: “NATO remains the single most effective institution
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for combining the political-military assets of the Western
powers, and its effectiveness must be preserved…”1

1

See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
Security. (Washington, D.C.: US Inst. Of Peace Press, 1998), p. 301
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CHAPTER 6: A VISION FOR NEW NATO

In five decades of its existence, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has passed through a number of phases, and boldly
entered a new era of international politics as a seasoned tried
and true establishment of collective defense.

Previously, bound

by stringent ties of solidarity in the face of the Soviet
threat, the great alliance in the new era has accomplished its
transition and performed a searching inventory of its strengths
and weaknesses, aiming at continuing its successful existence.
The expansion of its cause to new levels of cooperation in the
European region points out the fervent desire of the
organization’s leadership and participants to reassure their
respective populations and constituencies of continuing
stability in the political and economic arenas.

Although the

new branches and organizations that sprouted in Europe following
the collapse of the Soviet regime have indicated that
alternative means and tools of stabilization exist, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization maintained its lead.

Even though

the shared responsibilities of the NATO participants gradually
increased as the membership grew, and new goals were drawn up,
the parties to the Treaty maintained their solidarity in pursuit
of crisis management and peacekeeping with little variation.
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Such an outcome is viewed from a number of perspectives.

On one

hand, the internal mitigation and conflict resolution mechanisms
become more important than ever, and the role of NATO as a
collective security arrangement is paramount to organizational
stability. On the other hand, the relative instability of
Russian foreign policy, as characterized by domestic policy of
non-accommodation to the Western ideology1, reinforce NATO’s role
as a balance-of-power tool.
Having introduced the principles of George Liska’s realist
theory on alliance cohesion, alignment, and efficacy, I have
illustrated the applicability of those principles to formation
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its operating
doctrine, and structure. Then, I aimed at illustrating the
transformation of NATO’s cause, immediate and long-term goals,
and the continued applicability of realist principles to NATO’s
affairs.
The sole intention of such progressive illustration was to
reaffirm that, in practice, although the key security threat to
an alliance may have dissolved, NATO maintained its commitment
to a common goal by re-shaping its prerogatives.

The

flexibility and institutional nature of NATO has created a
diplomatic legacy, or a political regime, which now dictates a
1

Roger E. Kanet, Edward A. Kolodziej. Coping with Conflict after the Cold War.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1996), p. 60
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political framework of its own. In a sense, the institution that
was solidified through NATO’s enduring existence provides a
sufficiently stable and predictable European political
environment that would be hard to replace, if it were to become
defunct.

Therefore, the precept that was addressed in the first

chapter is correct: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
through its institutional transformation has transcended its
role as a traditional defensive alliance.
Certainly, any comprehensive analysis of a complex
collective defense mechanism, such as NATO should reach beyond
realism, and incorporate institutional theory, and perhaps, neoobjectivist approaches to international theory. In that sense,
attempting to predict NATO’s future behavior, solely using the
method and information utilized in this work, will yield onedimensional results. A single-theory approach does not possess
the full breadth necessary for understanding all policy and
institutional changes.
However, it is important to reiterate the key research
question of this work: Do realist and neo-realist theories of
alliance formation and cohesion, as outlined by George Liska,
explain the constraints of NATO’s cohesion throughout its term
of existence?

The answer to this question is a complex, yet a

well-founded, yes.

If one were to strip down any realist or
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neo-realist approach down to its bones, the key principle of
cooperation between states is a security threat, or a mere
possibility thereof, to the states’ sovereignty, territorial
integrity, or their forces.

Beyond all doubt, it is evident

that Liska’s realist approach is still useful in interpreting
the permutations of modern-day NATO.
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